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I. INTRODUCTION

Most people in this country own one or more insurance policies.' Most of these people pay for insurance coverage that is at
best difficult, and often impossible, to understand. Most people, in
fact, find their insurance policies so complex and confusing that
they make no attempt at all to read them. The result is that insurers prepare and offer to insureds standard policies which insureds
must accept or decline without any negotiations as to the terms of
coverage. Simple economics dictates this practice. If each insurance contract were individually negotiated, the enormous cost
would make insurance coverage unaffordable for most potential
buyers.2
It is likely that most, if not all, "insurance contracts were negotiated among persons of relatively equal bargaining power" in the
early years at Lloyd's Coffee House.3 The person seeking insurance
coverage usually wrote the insurance proposal, and the insurers
then "underwrote" the coverage. 4 It was not long, however, before
some or all of the coverage provisions included in the proposal
were suggested or required by the underwriters. In the course of
time, as various kinds of insurance were developed and marketed
both within and outside the Coffee House, it became increasingly
1. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining that private insurance premiums in the United States approach one
trillion dollars per year). "Perhaps no modem commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every
person in the United States." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944).
2. See Laurie Kindel Fett, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative
to Bending and Stretching TraditionalTools of ContractInterpretation,18 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1113, 1113 (1992).
3. Robert E. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (1970). In London, around the year 1691, Lloyd's Coffee
House became a central location for the underwriting of insurance on ships and
cargo. See ROBERT H. BROWN & JOHN WORMELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO WORKING IN
LLOYD'S MARKETS 9 (1987).
4. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 966. When an insurer "underwrites" coverage, it places its name at the bottom, following the description of the coverage,
and indicates the amount or percentage it is accepting. See id.
5. See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss4/6

2

1997]

REASONABLE
Ingram:INSURED'S
The Insured's Expectations
ShouldEXPECTATIONS
Be Honored Only if They are Rea

common to find insurance coverage provisions standardized for all
buyers, with the terms "almost invariably drafted by [the] insurers.6
There are several reasons why standardized contracts are desirable and probably indispensable. They allow for the spreading
of risks among insureds who are similarly situated and calculation
of premiums on the basis of a large and broad pool of insureds.7
They also produce economies of scale, which reduce the cost of insurance.8 Finally, they greatly reduce the expense involved in applying legal and other expertise which is required for the drafting
of contracts. 9

.

However, standardized contracts also create many problems.
They frequently do not make clear to insureds either the extent of
coverage affirmatively provided, or the limitations and exclusions
that reduce the coverage. 0 They often are complex and very difficult to read and understand." This often leads to a situation where
an insured believes he 12 has coverage only to be told, when he files
13
a claim, that the policy does not provide the expected coverage.
14
Standardized insurance policies are a prime example of a
contract of adhesion, 5 in which the insurance buyer has no real
choice except the standardized provisions offered to him. 16 There
is no negotiation; it is strictly "take it or leave it." 7 Insurance com6. Id.
7. See Edward T. Collins, Insurance Law - Insurance Contract Interpretation:
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Has No Place in Illinois, 1985 S.ILL. U. L.J.
687, 687.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 687-89.
11. See id. at 687.
12. When the gender for a personal pronoun could be either male or female, I use the masculine pronoun generically, due to habit and my masculine
personal orientation. By doing so I avoid the rather awkward "he or she" and the
grammatically incorrect "they." I trust that female authors will balance the scales
on the other side.
13. See Collins, supranote 7, at 687-89.
14. Standard form (adhesion) contracts account for more than 99% of all
contracts made. See W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
15. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981). The California Supreme Court stated, "The term ['contract of adhesion'] signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargain-

ing strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to
the contract or reject it." Id.
16. See Keeton, supranote 3, at 966.
17. See David L. Goodhue, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Massachu-

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

3

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. 23,
Iss. 4REVIEW
[1997], Art. 6
WILLIAM
MITCHELL
LAW

[Vol. 23

panies are therefore in a position to give "an illusion of broad coverage which is severely limited by highly technical exclusionary
hidden in a mass of fine print in an obscure
language oftentimes
18
part of the policy."

In construing adhesion contracts most, if not all, courts apply
the rule of contra proferentem,'9 which mandates that ambiguous language in a contract, especially an insurance policy, will be strictly
construed against the drafter of the contract (almost always the insurer) and in favor of the other party (usually the insured).2°
Courts often paint a picture of naked power on the one hand and
helpless need on the other, indicating "a clear need to redress the
balance [by enforcing] ...the contract according to the expecta-

tion of the adhering party" (here, the insured).21 Not infrequently,
courts go even further and use the ambiguity rule "to avoid what
ambiguities which
they perceive to be unfair results, fabricating
22
they then construe against the insurer."
II. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Although the doctrine of reasonable expectations was not
formally denominated as such until Professor (later Judge) Keeton's seminal article in 1970, it had an influence on judicial decisions in much earlier years.23 For example, in 1918, in Bird v. Saint
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Justice Cardozo analyzed an insetts and New Hampshire: A ComparativeAnalysis, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 891, 896 n.32
(1982). The phrase "contract of adhesion" probably first appeared in an article
about life insurance. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivey of a Life-Insurance Policy,
33 HARV.L. REV.198, 222 (1919).
18. Goodhue, supra note 17, at 896 n.32.
19. "Contraproferentem" is a term that is "[u]sed in connection with the construction of written documents to the effect that an ambiguous provision is construed most strongly against the person who selected the language." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also states
that "[i]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or
a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the
party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
20. See Collins, supra note 7, at 690.
21. Conrad L. Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of ReasonableExpectation,
6 FORUM 252, 252 (1971).

22. Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1461, 1465 (1989).
23. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 1322 (arguing that courts should "rely on the
principle of honoring reasonable expectations and disallowing unconscionable
advantage when there are compelling reasons for protecting the insured beyond
the normal scope of waiver and estoppel").
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surance coverage issue by considering the reasonable expectations
of the "ordinary business man when making an ordinary business
contract." 4 Nearly thirty years later, in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., Judge Learned Hand interpreted an insurance contract provision in conformity with the understanding of an
ordinary insured.2'
There is a difference between the use of "reasonable expectations" by Cardozo in Bird and by Hand in Gaunt. Subsequent cases
relying on Bird indicate that the later courts understood "reasonable expectations" to apply to the interpretation of particular terms
in a policy - what the insured reasonably would expect a term to
mean - rather than to the insured's general expectation of coverage under the policy. 2 6 On the other hand, in Gaunt Judge Hand

held that, despite unambiguous language to the contrary in a receipt given to an applicant for life insurance,
24. 120 N.E. 86, 87 (N.Y. 1918). In Bird, the plaintiff sought coverage for his
boat which was damaged as a result of a nearby explosion. Id. at 86. The insurer
sought to deny coverage based on the remoteness of the initial fire which set off
the explosion causing damage to the plaintiff's boat. See id. Justice Cardozo explained that the reasonable expectations of the insured, whether express or inferred, are significant in determining the insurer's liability on the contract. The
court held for the insurer, however, stating, "Fire must reach the thing insured, or
come within such proximity to it that damage, direct or indirect, is within the
compass of reasonable probability." Id. at 88.
25. 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). In Gaunt,
the plaintiff sought recovery pursuant to a life insurance contract after her son's
death. Id. at 599. The insurer denied coverage, arguing the application had not
yet been approved by the insurer at the time of the son's death. Id. at 601. Judge
Hand held that coverage did exist, explaining that insurers must bear the burden
of any resulting confusion surrounding the nature of a policy when the policy's
words are uncommon and the insured is "unacquainted with the niceties of life
insurance." Id. In addition, Judge Hand intimated that injustice would result if
an ordinary applicant for a life insurance policy, who paid the premium and successfully passed his physical examination, was left uncovered because the insurer
eventually failed to approve the policy. Id. at 602.
26. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 828
(Ct. App. 1993) ("When particular policy language is ambiguous, it is interpreted
in the sense the insurer believed the insured understood it at the time of formation."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 297, 400
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that courts may interpret an insurance contract
only when particular terms in the policy are ambiguous); Sentry Sec. Sys., Inc. v.
Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 223 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (noting
that if the language of an insurance contract is ambiguous, the court may construe its meaning); Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 801
(Utah 1992) (recognizing that some states allow insureds to recover when a particular term in an insurance policy is ambiguous); see also Ware, supra note 22, at
1467-69 (discussing cases which use the insured's reasonable expectations to "fill
in the gaps" created by ambiguous terms in a contract of insurance).
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[t]he ordinary applicant who has paid his first premium
and has successfully passed his physical examination,
would not by the remotest chance understand the clause
as leaving him uncovered until the insurer at its leisure
approved the risk; he would assume that he was getting
immediate coverage for his money.21
It is the latter approach that was later expressly formulated in Keeton's article. 8
This view was further expounded in 1961 by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co.2

The

court stated that members of the public who purchase insurance
are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary
to fulfill their reasonable expectations. They should not
be subjected to technical encumbrances or to hidden pitfalls[,] and their policies should be construed liberally in
their favor to the end that coverage is afforded
30 "to the full
extent that any fair interpretation will allow."
In 1970, Professor Robert E. Keeton of the Harvard Law
School l published a two-part article identifying a number of cases
interpreting insurance contracts which, in his opinion, demonstrated new principles of insurance law. 2 After examining these
cases, Keeton identified the principle involved as follows:
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study
of the lolicy provisions would have negated those expectations.

This principle, usually referred to as the "doctrine of reasonable
expectations" or the "doctrine of the layman's reasonable expecta27. Gaunt, 160 F.2d at 602. The agent gave Gaunt a receipt which provided
that coverage would not be in force until the insurer had approved the coverage.
Id. at 600. Upon approval, the coverage would relate back and be effective as of
the date of the medical examination. Id. The medical staff examined and approved Gaunt and then sent on its approval for final acceptance by the company
underwriter. Id. Gaunt died the day the medical staff sent its approval. Id.
28. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 966-74.
29. 170A.2d22 (N.J. 1961).
30. Id. at 26.
31. Professor Keeton later became Judge Keeton of the United States District Court. See Robert E. Keeton, Warning Defect: Origins, Policies, and Directions,
30 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 367, 367 n.a (1997) (providing a brief biography of

Judge Keeton's career).
32. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 970-73.
33. Keeton, supranote 3, at 967.
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tions," has received a great deal of attention from courts and writers in the years since 1970. 34 Some have accepted the doctrine with
approval; some have been essentially indifferent about it; some
have expressly rejected it.35
There can be no doubt that to some extent the insurance industry has brought this problem on itself. The marketing of insurance is designed to create and build upon the trust and confidence
of the public. Insurers tell us that they are "like a good neighbor,"
that we are "in good hands with" them, and that they provide an
"umbrella" or a "shield." Not surprisingly, this leads insurance
buyers to expect very broad protection when they buy "full coverage," an "all-risk policy," or the "comprehensive, broad-form policy." There is no question that this has been a strong influence on
those who favor the reasonable expectations doctrine. Yet, as Keeton himself pointed out, application of the doctrine should be
tempered by a recognition that even though one supports the
broad principle of honoring reasonable expectations, those expec-6
tations should be honored only if they are indeed reasonable.
The doctrine should not be distorted to include expectations of
the insured which are patently unreasonable. 7
III. INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
Keeton started with the generally recognized "proposition that
policy language will be construed as laymen would understand it
and not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters." s As he correctly indicated, this proposition is merely "a corollary of the principle of resolving ambiguities against the insurer,"
which is universally accepted."9 Keeton urged that the doctrine
should be extended beyond merely resolving ambiguities, and
should protect "the policyholder's expectations as long as they are
objectively reasonable from the layman's point of view, in spite of
the fact that had he made a painstaking study of the contract, he

34. See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 824 (1990) (explaining that the

"reasonable expectations" doctrine has been a part of a considerable amount of
litigation and the subject of numerous legal articles over the last twenty years).
35. See id. at 823-24.
36.

See Keeton, supra note 3, at 970 n.15.

37. See id.
38.

Id. at 967.

39. Id.
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would have understood the limitation that defeats the expectations
at issue."4 °
Courts in various jurisdictions have taken different approaches
in applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations. First, some
courts will apply the doctrine only if there is an ambiguity in the
policy 4 ' and then usually will resolve the ambiguity in the insured's
favor.42 Second, some courts will apply the doctrine where the policy language is unclear or the terms limiting coverage are hidden,
so that the insured cannot be expected to understand or discover
them.43 Third, some courts apply the doctrine as Keeton intended,
honoring the insured's expectation of coverage even though the
policy clearly and explicitly excludes coverage.4 In one way or another, the doctrine of reasonable expectations has been applied to
almost every kind of insurance, from the common consumer policies (automobile, homeowners, et cetera)
to the more sophisti45
cated coverages of business and industry.
A.

Ambiguity

A majority of the courts tend to favor insureds in disputes with
insurers. Many decisions are justified only by "the maxim that an
instrument is to be construed against its drafter."6 Courts frequently search for and somehow find an ambiguity to construe in'
favor of the insured and against "the deep-pocketed insurer. 01
This excessive zeal to find an ambiguity is especially prevalent with
40. Id. Keeton argued that an objective standard allows a greater degree of
certainty and predictability, as well as a method of achieving equity between insured and insurer. Id. at 968.
41. See Kenneth J. Homer, Jr., Comment, Insurance - Contracts- The Ambiguity in the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 62 N.D. L. REV. 423, 425 n.15 (1986)
(listing the jurisdictions where courts have refused to apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations unless an ambiguity exists in the insurance policy);Joseph E.
Minnock, Comment, Protecting the Insured from an InsuranceAdhesion Policy: The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Utah, UTAH L. Rrv. 837, 854 (1991) (noting
that the California courts and the New Hampshire courts have held that the doctrine does not apply unless the policy language is ambiguous).
42. See Homer, supranote 41, at 425.
43. See id. at 426-27.
44. See Minnock, supra note 41, at 854.
45. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 323, 346-47 n.78 (1986) (providing examples of the wide range of policies
that have been subject to the doctrine of reasonable expectations).
46. Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law andJudge-Made Insurance: Honoring the ReasonableExpectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1151 (1981).
47. Id.
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courts that are determined to achieve a "fair" result for the insured
but are unwilling to openly espouse the direct approach favored by
Keeton, perhaps deeming the latter too radical in terms of traditional contract law.
A vivid example of the extreme lengths to which some courts
will go can be found in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co.48

The court used an unusual test in determining whether there was
an ambiguity: "[IT]he very fact that [the parties'] respective positions as to what this policy says are so contrary compels one to conclude that the agreement is indeed ambiguous., 49 Application of
this test would mean that if the creative mind of the insured's attorney could find some interpretation of the policy language that
differed from the interpretation of the insurer, there would be an
ambiguity which the court would construe in favor of coverage.
Most courts do not expressly go this far in defining "ambiguity" in favor of the insured. A more common definition can be
found in Stordahl v. Government Employees Insurance Co.:

An ambiguity does not exist, however, merely because the
parties disagree as to the interpretation of a term. An
"ambiguity" exists only where the contract as a whole and
all the extrinsic evidence support two different interpretations, both of which are reasonable.i °
Courts which consider the insured's reasonable expectations
in resolving ambiguities usually accept the limitations that this
should not be used to rewrite the policy and that a clear and unambiguous coverage provision should be enforced even though it
5
may be surprising or one-sidedY.
"[T]he insured can reasonably
expect only
the coverage afforded by the plain language of the
52
contract."

48. 225 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 1975).
49. Id. at 837.
50. 564 P.2d 63, 67 n.13 (Alaska 1977).
51. See, e.g., Wallace v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 421 So. 2d 131, 133 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1982) (holding that the additional living expenses clause in the homeowner's policy, which limited such payments to the time required to become setfled in permanent quarters, was not ambiguous; refusing to rewrite the policy in
favor of the insured); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co., 329 S.E.2d 517,
519-20 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the court did not have authority to make
the insurance policy more beneficial by extending coverage for which the insured
had not contracted).
52. Farm Air Flying Serv. v. Southeastern Aviation Ins. Servs., Inc., 254 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1988).
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
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There is no logical reason to require an ambiguity in order to
invoke the doctrine of reasonable expectations. It is well settled
that ambiguities will be construed against the insurer. This rule
should be applied before even considering the reasonable expectations doctrine. Only when no ambiguity exists should the expectations of the insured be considered. "[A] mbiguity should be wholly
irrelevant to the doctrine of reasonable expectations because it is
neither necessary nor sufficient for application of the doctrine. " "'
B.

Policy Is Not Clear, or Exclusion Is Hidden

As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in Storms v.
United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., "[a]lthough insurers have
had over one hundred years to hone their policies into forms that
would not ferry the unwary reader on a trip through Wonderland,
they regrettably have not seen fit to do so."54

Courts consistently

point out that insurers can defeat an insured's expectation of coverage by using provisions of limitation which are "conspicuous,
plain[,] and clear" 55 and which are brought to the attention of the
insured "either by [his] being required to sign it or by having his
attention particularly called to it."56 Despite that, insurers continue

to use provisions that courts find are not clearly worded or are
placed in remote areas of the policy.Y7 "[I]f the policy contains a

hidden trap or pitfall, or if the fine print takes away that which has
been given by the large print, " 58 many courts will rule that there is
coverage based on the insured's reasonable expectations. 59 This
53. Fett, supra note 2, at 1134.
54. 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978).
55. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 294 (Cal. 1962).
56. Id. at 296 (quoting Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 182 P. 293,
298 (Cal. 1919)).
57. See, e.g., Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 927
(Del. 1982) (explaining that the fine print hidden in the policy does not take
away what was given in large print); Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985) (providing that where major exclusions are hidden in definitions section, insured is required only to have reasonable knowledge of terms).
58. Hallowell, 443 A.2d at 927.

59. Many courts explain that the doctrine of reasonable expectations should
apply only when the terms of the policy are ambiguous or when the policy has

hidden exclusions.

See, e.g., Evenchik v. State Farm Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 99, 104

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984);Johnson v. Colonial Ins. Co., No. 95C-05-189JOH, 1997 WL
126994, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1996); Delledonne v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 621 A.2d 350, 354 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); Waller v. Rocky Mountain Fire
& Cas. Co., 535 P.2d 530, 539 (Or. 1975).
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frequently occurs when a broad measure of protection is afforded
by the first page of the policy, while the actual coverage is severely
limited "in inconspicuous exclusionary clauses buried in a mass of
fine print."6° Therefore, where the insurer has failed "to dispel an
expectation of coverage ... which it was responsible for creating in

the first place," the insurer will be liable.6
C. Policy Is Clear,but a Layman Would Expect Coverage
Some courts apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations in
its broadest form, mandating coverage even where the policy unambiguously and conspicuously denies coverage. 63 An oft-cited example of this can be found in C&JFertilizer,Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.6
In this case, the burglary insurance policy
unambiguously required that there be "visible marks" of "felonious
entry... by actual force and violence. 6 5 If anyone at C&J had read
the policy, there would have been no reasonable expectation of
coverage for a burglary where no marks were left on the exterior of
the premises.66 Despite that, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized
that most insureds do not read insurance policies, 67 and the court
therefore held that C&J was not bound by policy terms of which it
was unawarei6 The court further held that C&J reasonably would
expect coverage where there was extensive proof of a burglary by

60. Goodhue, supra note 17, at 904; see also, e.g., Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 365 A.2d 744, 746 (N.H. 1976) ("This exclusion clause [was]
buried amidst thirteen others [all] either irrelevant to [the insured] or unexpected.").
61. Goodhue, supranote 17, at 904. Because the insurer is to blame for creating "a misleading impression of coverage," the insurer will be liable for the subsequent failure to dispel the expectation of coverage. Id.
62. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 17677 (Iowa 1975) (entering judgment for the plaintiff after applying the reasonable
expectations doctrine to nullify applicable exclusions); Canadian Universal Ins.
Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1977) (providing for coverage despite unambiguous language in the policy and endorsement - based on the
reasonable expectations doctrine).
64. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
65. Id. at 171; see also Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.,
366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985) (explaining that both the police and the trial
court found that the burglary was an "outside job," even though there were no
visible marks of forcible entry).
66. C &JFertilizer,227 N.W.2d at 176.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id.at 177.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

11

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. 23,
[1997], Art. 6
WILLIAM
MITCHELL
LAIss.
W 4REVIEW

[Vol. 23

outsiders as opposed to an "inside job."69
Another situation where some courts will find coverage despite
a clear and conspicuous exclusion in the policy can be found
where an insurer's advertising and brochures lead an insured to
expect coverage. ° In such cases a court may require an insurer "to
provide coverage according to its advertising, despite
more restric71
tive provisions in the insurance contract itself.,
Yet even those courts which apply a very broad version of the
reasonable expectations doctrine usually will require that the insured's expectations be reasonable. For example, in Baker v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., the insured, while driving another per-

72
son's car, hit a median and warning sign and damaged the car.
Her own automobile insurance policy specifically excluded from its
liability coverage "damage to property... in the care, custody or
control of any insured person."7 3 The court said that since the insured explicitly had rejected collision coverage, she could not reasonably expect coverage for damage to a car she was driving.74

69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Futz v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 514, 518-19 (S.D. Tex.
1973) (providing for coverage based on the insured's reasonable expectations
that life insurance coverage would begin after a completed application was returned to the insurer, who solicited such policies through the mail, and despite
language in the literature explaining coverage would not begin until the insurer
approved it); Suarez v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 254 Cal. Rptr. 377, 382 (Ct. App.
1988) (explaining that because an insurer is bound by the expectations it has created, the insurer could be forced to provide coverage based on its advertising);
Klos v. Mobil Oil, Co., 259 A.2d 889, 893 (N.J. 1969) (holding that direct-mail solicitation to purchase accident insurance constituted a sufficient and complete
offer which the plaintiffs reasonably could expect to guarantee coverage with the
return of an application); Riordan v. Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 422 N.Y.S.2d
811, 815 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that insureds reasonably relied on misleading advertisement for travel accident insurance and, thus, the advertised direct-mail solicitation was an offer that could be accepted with the return of a check and enrollment form).
71. Suarez, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
72. 475 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 675 (noting that because the insured knew she was not covered for
acts of her own negligence with regard to her own automobile, she could not expect greater coverage with regard to another person's automobile); cf Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d 987, 991 (Idaho 1980) (stating that insured could not
reasonably expect coverage for riot or mob action where that was expressly excluded in policy, insured's attorneys were aware of exclusion and did not object,
and exclusion could have been removed by paying extra premium).
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Courts that Have Rejected Keeton's Approach

As discussed in Part II supra, Keeton proposed that courts
should honor the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage
even though the express language of the policy itself made clear
that there was no coverage. Some courts have expressly rejected
this approach, holding that insurance policies "should be enforced
according to [their] clear meaning and purpose regardless of the
coverage the insured thought he had."75 These courts take the position that they should not "engraft such a novel doctrine upon the
law."7 6 They also point out that Keeton's approach "requires a
court to rewrite an insurance contract which does not meet popuof
lar expectations[,] [and that] [s]uch rewriting is done regardless
"v
,
contract.
the
to
parties
the
by
into
entered
the bargain
While rejecting "[s]uch judicial activism,"7 however, some
courts imply that their refusal to apply the reasonable expectations
doctrine may be limited to the facts of the instant case and that
such refusal does not necessarily constitute a total and absolute rejection of the doctrine for all possible situations. 7 For example, in
Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Insurance Co., the court pointed
out that "[t] he facts of [the] case. .. [did] not indicate any misrep-

resentation, overreaching, or other conduct on behalf of the insurer which would justify abrogating the parties' agreement. Nor
was there any evidence that [the insured] was beguiled into believing it had more protection than it actually did."8 ° The court further noted that the coverage definition in question "was written in
the same style and size type as the rest of the policy provisions[,]
75. Ryan v. Harrison, 699 P.2d 230, 233 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
App. Ct.
76. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Adkisson, 459 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill.
1984); see also Bain v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 463 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984) (recognizing that Illinois has not adopted the doctrine of reasonable
expectations); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mangum, 383 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989) (noting that the Supreme Court of South Carolina never has accepted the
doctrine of reasonable expectations).
77. Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1197
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
78. Id.
79. See id.; see also, e.g., Zaragoza v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 549 N.W.2d
510, 515-16 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the plaintiff presented no facts that would
have created the reliance interest necessary to apply the reasonable expectations
doctrine); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 114 (Iowa
1983) (holding that the facts of the case precluded the defendant from claiming
he reasonably expected to be covered for a highway accident because he had purchased only on-the-premises insurance).
80. Sterling Merchandise,506 N.E.2d at 1197.
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...was

not hidden away in fine print in an obscure place[,] [and]
was not so complex or esoteric that a competent businessman
could not understand it."8 '

The court further found that the in-

sured, "a large company presumably run by astute business people," "chose not to discuss the terms of2 the polic[y] with its agent"
and "tacitly refused to read" the policy.

In addition to the implicit suggestion that this court might
honor the insured's reasonable expectations if the facts were different, the Sterling court also suggested that it might apply the reasonable expectations doctrine if the policy definition at issue had
been ambiguous. 3 As discussed previously, using reasonable expectations to resolve ambiguities is not what Keeton had in mind,
since it is basic contract law that ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the insured. However, a number of courts which have rejected Keeton's suggested use of the doctrine nevertheless purport
to honor the insured's reasonable expectations in resolving ambiguities. 8
IV. OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE STANDARD?

One of the difficulties in any application of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is determining the proper standard to use.
There are several possibilities:
(1) the expectations of an objectively "reasonable person";86

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1198. "Because the definition is not ambiguous, it must be given
its plain and ordinary meaning." Id.
84. See discussion supraPart III.A.
85. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 721 (8th Cir.
1981) (applying Minnesota law and stating that Minnesota applies the reasonable
expectations doctrine only where there are ambiguities in an insurance policy);
Carley v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 521 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Conn. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that "[slince we find no ambiguity in the policy provisions, we don't
consider the question of the policy holder's expectations"); Soliva v. Shand,
Morahan & Co., 345 S.E.2d 33, 36 (W. Va. 1986) (stating that where there is no
ambiguity, the plain language of the policy controls).
86. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366
N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985); DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 398 A.2d
1274, 1282 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman,J., dissenting).
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(2) the expectations of "a reasonable person in the position of the insured";87 or
(3) the expectations of this particular insured.
In many cases, unhappily, members of the same court, in majority
and dissenting opinions, disagree as to what expectations are reasonable. 9 Even more frustrating, it is quite common in such cases
for neither side to explain why it reached its particular conclusion. 90 There also is great variation as to the factors courts will consider beyond the policy language itself. Among the extrinsic factors that are sometimes considered are marketing practices, 9' policy
structure and design,92 and underwriting concerns. 93
A.

Insured Expected to Read, or Deemed to Have Read, the Policy?

Traditional rules of contract law suggest that an insured has
some duty to read and attempt to understand the policy. 94 An in87. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Motors, Inc., 244 A.2d 64, 67 (N.H.
1968).
88. See, e.g., Stewart-Smith Haidinger, Inc. v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 682 P.2d 1108,
1117-18 (Alaska 1984); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Five Points Fire Co., 444 A.2d
304, 307-08 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
89. See, e.g., DiOrio, 398 A.2d at 1280-81 (discussing in the majority opinion
the standard of the expectation of the insured, while the dissenting opinion
claims the majority opinion pays only lip service to this standard while using alternative reasoning to decide the case).
90. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Alaska
1979) (describing a hybrid standard which essentially boils down to the court interpreting the insurance provision and the surrounding facts to decide what expectation, if any, was reasonable); Andrews v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 467 A.2d
254, 257 (N.H. 1983) (weighing the evidence presented and the court's own interpretation of the insurance provision to decide what was reasonable).
91. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 297-98 (Cal. 1962)
(holding that an airline passenger who purchased trip insurance from a vending
machine reasonably would expect coverage for the whole trip, including reasonably substituted transportation necessitated by emergency).
92. See, e.g., Holz Rubber Co. v. American Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055, 106162 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the policy, via its structure and design, implied that
the insured was covered).
93. See, e.g., Herzog v. National Emergency Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 841, 843-44
(Cal. 1970) (holding that a homeowner's policy owner should not expect such a
policy to extend to automobiles).
94. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271, 278 (Minn. 1985) (stating that the doctrine of reasonable expectations does
not automatically remove insured's responsibility to read policy); Soliva v. Shand,
Morahan & Co., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 33, 36 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that a party to a
contract has a duty to read it); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County
Sch. Dist., 763 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that a court will not absolve
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sured's claim of coverage should be weaker if he could have read
and understood the policy and had sufficient time to do so, but did
not avail himself of the opportunity. 95 A fair standard might be "to
interpret the policy in the light of what a more than casual reading
of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured."96
However, this probably should not mean that the insured has a
duty to read the policy in every case, nor that he would understand
it even if he read it. Moreover, what constitutes a "reasonable effort" or a "more than casual reading" may vary according to the
circumstances, such as the experience and sophistication of the insured.97 Many laymen lack "the necessary skills to read and understand insurance policies, which are typically long, set out in very
small type[,] and written from a legalistic or insurance expert's
perspective." 98 In fact, there are probably few lawyers in general
practice, or judges drawn therefrom, who can read an insurance
policy with a clear understanding of what is covered and what is
not. If these people, supposedly intelligent and well trained, have
such difficulty, how much can we expect from laymen?
We also must recognize that the adhesive nature of insurance
contracts encourages insureds not to read them. These contracts
usually are complex and filled with legal terms of art, leading insureds to believe (often quite correctly) that they probably would
not understand even if they did read the policy. 99 Furthermore,
since the insured will not be able to change the coverage provisions, he has less incentive to inform himself in order to request
better coverage.100
parties to an insurance policy of their duty to read the policy).
95. See Atwater Creamery, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (finding that unless the policy
provision is ambiguous, or unless the exclusion is hidden obscurely in the policy
and such provision is not a normal or usual policy provision, failure to read the
policy is fatal in terms of the reasonable expectations doctrine).
96. Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Motors, Inc., 244 A.2d 64, 67 (N.H. 1968).
97. See Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 225 A.2d 328, 333 (N.J. 1966)
("While the insured is always supposed to read the policy, only a very hardy soul
would have plowed through all of the fine print here in an effort to understand
the many terms and conditions.").
98. Atwater Creamery, 366 N.W.2d at 277.
99. See Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1038 (1st
Cir. 1971).
100. See Delancy v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581, 587-88 (1873). Of one policy, the New Hampshire Supreme Court observed:
The study of [the policy provisions] was rendered particularly unattractive, by a profuse intermixture of discourses on subjects in which the
premium payer would have no interest. The compound, if read by him,

would, unless he were an extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a
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The incentive to read the policy is further reduced by the fact
that insureds usually do not receive policies until some time after
the purchase.'
Of course, the less we require of insureds as to
reading and understanding policies, the more we allow insurance
buyers to be less careful in selecting proper coverage. If an insured
is not expected to read the policy and is bound only by that which
he did read, the effect is to bind him only to that which he will admit - after the loss - to having read and understood. This possibility
leads directly to Keeton's suggestion that fairness requires that an
insured who does take the time to read and understand the policy
should not be penalized for doing so. 102 "If the enforcement of a
policy provision would defeat the reasonable expectations of the
great majority of policyholders to whose claims it is relevant, it will
not be enforced even against those who know of its restrictive
terms."1 °3
B. Sophistication of Insured
A number of courts have held that the contra proferentem principle and the doctrine of reasonable expectations should not be
applied where the insured is a large enterprise,
as contrasted with
•
104
an individual consumer or small business. A typical example can
mere flood of darkness and confusion. Some of the most material stipulations were concealed in a mass of rubbish on the back side of the policy and the following page... where scarcely any one would think of
looking for information so important.... As if it were feared
that.., some extremely eccentric person might attempt to examine and
understand the meaning of the involved and intricate net in which he
was to be entangled, it was printed in such small type, and in lines so
long and crowded, that the perusal of it was made physically difficult,
painful and injurious.
Id.
101. See Marston, 439 F.2d at 1038 (citing 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559, at
265-66 (1960); W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 540 (1971)).
102. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 6.3(b) (1971).
103.

Id. at 358.

104. See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632
F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing how a large corporation, advised by
counsel, can have equal bargaining power with an insurance company); Industrial
Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 874, 881 (E.D. La.
1987) (explaining that a large municipality, represented by professionals, a city
attorney, and an experienced insurance agent, stood on equal footing with the
insurers and had significant input in negotiating the terms of the policy); McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 547 (D.NJ. 1986) (finding that
the policy in question had been negotiated byJohnson &Johnson, a sophisticated
insured, and that most of the amendments to the policy were made by the com-
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be found in Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Co. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co. 05 As the court noted, Proctor & Gamble (P&G) was a
co-drafter of the policy, "not simply a party given a take-it-or-leave-it
option.... [T]o a considerable extent [the policies] were tailormade." °6 P&G had an insurance department, its own lawyers, and
the economic clout to influence the policy's terms.0 7 The final policy "was profoundly more than a standard insurance policy... [-]
significant portions of [its] language were customized at P&G's insistence."'108
Thus, in contrast to the individual insurance consumer or
small business insured, larger entities typically will have a "risk
manager" who is a skilled and experienced professional responsible for determining the insurance needs of his employer and securing appropriate insurance coverage.' °9 In addition, these larger entities usually have the assistance of legal counsel and independent
brokerage firms which specialize in negotiating and obtaining
business insurance coverage. Clearly, there is seldom any basis for
protecting such insureds from sophisticated, over-reaching insurance companies.
The issue of sophistication of the insured becomes more difficult, however, when the insured appears to be intelligent, well educated, and experienced in business matters. While some small and
medium-sized manufacturers, retailers, tradesmen, and such may
have the benefit of skilled advisers, most do not and are in essentially the same position as the individual consumer. There is, perhaps, at least one arguable difference. People in business, even on
a small scale, should have considerable knowledge about those
risks that have an immediate relation to their business. A tree
trimmer, for example, should be well aware of the risk of falling
from a high place or of making contact with live electric wires and,
thus, should know that he should seek coverage for these risks.
Some courts accept this rationale as supporting a rule that in depany, thereby removing any unfair advantage of the insurance company), affd,
831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987).
105. 924 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1991).
106. Id. at 639.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under
Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 137 (stating that commercial
insureds often rely on sophisticated brokers or knowledgeable risk managers to
negotiate their policies, resulting in policies that are bargained for at arm's
length).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss4/6
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termining the reasonable expectations for coverage under an insurance policy of someone in a certain business - for example, a
general contractor - the test is the reasonable expectations of the
usual general contractor, not that of the usual layman."'
The sophistication issue becomes even murkier when the insured is an individual who has purchased an ordinary consumer
policy, such as automobile or homeowners coverage. On one side
you find cases such as Minnesota Mutual Fire & Casualty Insurance

Co. v. Manderfeld, where the court held that the insurer could deny
coverage on the basis of a clear and unambiguous exclusion in the
policy. 1 ' The court pointed out that the insured was a certified
public accountant who could read and understand the exclusion
without the need for "painstaking study."" 2
In sharp contrast is Karol v. New Hampshire Insurance Co."3 In
response to the insurer's argument that an exclusion should bar
recovery because the insured was a bright and sophisticated attorney and had read the policy, the court stated: "We need not consider the intelligence of the insured in determining whether he
comprehended the terms of an insurance policy."" 4

"The well-

established rule in this [s] tate is that insurance policies are interpreted from the standpoint of the average layman 'in light of what
a more than casual reading of the policy reveals to an ordinary intelligent insured."' 5 The court thus held that the standard is ob110. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152,
190 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (stating that courts must look at the specific business of the
insured to determine whether a particular insured intended and expected coverage); Hartland Computer Leasing Corp. v. Insurance Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525,
527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that courts seek to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties from the totality of the circumstances); Estrin Constr. Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (observing that

the question is not whether the policy exclusion is ambiguous, but whether the
policy exclusion runs contrary to the specific insured's reasonable expectations).
But see Atkins v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Lawrence v. New York Life Ins. Co., 649 S.W.2d 461, 467 (Mo. App. 1983))

("Where the doctrine is applicable, it must appear that the expectation of coverage was not that of the claimant alone but was that of the average public member.").
111.

482 N.W.2d 521,527 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).

112. Id.at525.
113. 414 A.2d 939 (N.H. 1980).

114. Id. at 941 (citations omitted); see also Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 458 N.E.2d 611, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding irrelevant the fact that the

insured was an attorney, especially as there was no showing he had any expertise
in insurance matters).
115.

Brown v. City of Laconia, 386 A.2d 1276, 1277 (N.H. 1978) (quoting
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jective, without regard to the sophistication or actual knowledge of
the insured. 116 If an average or ordinary insured would expect coverage, there is coverage."'
C.

Would Insurer Think That Insured Would Expect Coverage?

It sometimes is suggested that the extent to which an insurer
knows or should know that a reasonable person in the insured's
position would expect coverage should be a relevant consideration."" This is based on a provision in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts,which states: "Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he
knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement." 9 There is certainly an equitable argument
for requiring an insurer to provide the coverage which its words or
conduct, in advertising or agent's activities, would lead the insured
reasonably to expect, and which the insurer should know is expected. °
V. "REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS" RUN AMOK
A.

Examples

Even if one accepts the requirement that an insurer should
provide coverage which the insured reasonably expects, this requirement should be limited to expectations which truly are reasonable. Some courts simply go beyond even a liberal test or standard for reasonableness. There are, unfortunately, many such
cases, but three oft-cited cases provide typical examples. In Gray v.
Zurich Insurance Co., the complaint in a suit against the insured alleged an intentional assault. 12' The policy excluded coverage for
injury caused intentionally by the insured.12 The insured said he
Aetna Ins.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Co. v. State Motors, 244 A.2d 64, 67 (N.H. 1968)).
See Karol,414 A.2d at 941.
See id.
See Henderson, supra note 34, at 846-53.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
120. See Abraham, supra note 46, at 1155; cf Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 107-13 (Iowa 1981) (finding that where farm liability
policy excluded coverage for motor vehicles "while away from insured's premises
or at the ways immediately adjoining" the premises, insurer had no reason to
think insured wanted this policy to cover automobile liability away from premises,
as that usually is covered by insured's automobile liability policy).
121. 419 P.2d 168,169 (Cal. 1966).
122. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss4/6

20

1997]

Ingram:INSURED'S
The Insured's Expectations
ShouldEXPECTATIONS
Be Honored Only if They are Rea
REASONABLE

acted in self-defense, but the insurer refused to defend the suit on
his behalf.123 The insured then unsuccessfully defended the suit on
the self-defense theory. 12425 Thereafter, the insured sued the insurer
for its failure to defend.

The California Supreme Court said that the insured's liability
insurance policy provided that the insurer would defend any suit
against the insured alleging bodily injury even though the allegations of the suit were groundless, false, or fraudulent, and this
would lead an insured reasonably to expect a defense of any suit
regardless of merit or cause. 2 6 But why would a reasonable insured
expect the insurer to provide a defense for an intentional assault
which was excluded expressly from indemnity coverage? Would
the insured not have purchased this policy had he understood that
the insurer would not defend a suit based on an intentional assault?
The court further attempted to justify its holding by noting
that the pleadings could be amended to allege that the injury was
caused unintentionally and negligently.2 7 That is true, of course,
and at the time of such an amendment a duty to defend would
arise. But in the absence of any allegations which would create a
potential duty of the insurer to indemnify, there should be no duty
to defend.
A similar example of excessive judicial zeal to require coverage
can be found in C&J Fertilizer,Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.""

The definition of burglary in the insured's mercantile burglary and
robbery policy included a requirement that there be a felonious
entry into the premises by actual force and violence, of which there
were visible marks.2 9 The evidence in the case strongly suggested
that there had been a felonious entry, as opposed to an "inside job"
by an employee, but there were no visible marks of force or violence on the exterior of the building. 3 °
The majority of the court allowed recovery by the insured. 131
The court relied on the fact that the definition of burglary was
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 169-70.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
See Gray, 419 P.2d at 177.
227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 181.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

21

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. 23,
Iss. 4REVIEW
[1997], Art. 6
ILLAM
MJTCHELL
LAW

[Vol. 23

never read to or by the insured's people, was not explained by the
insurer's agent, and did not comport with a layman's concept of
the crime of burglary. 3 2 The most an insured might reasonably anticipate was a requirement of visual evidence (abundant in this
case) indicating an "outside" rather than an "inside"job.""
The four dissenters stated quite correctly that the majority was
giving the insured "ex post facto insurance coverage which it not
only did not buy but which it knew it did not buy." 1 4 "Burglary" was
clearly and unambiguously defined, and there was "unequivocal
testimony from an officer and director of the [insured] corporation that he knew the disputed provision was in the policies."' 3 5
The dissenters further stated that they should not "meddle with
contracts which clearly and plainly
state their meaning simply be3 6
cause we dislike that meaning.",

A third and final example of judicial excess in applying the
doctrine of reasonable expectations is found in Foremost Insurance
Co. v. Putzier.137 A theft claim was made against Foremost by a con-

cessionaire at Evil Knievel's jump across the Snake River.'3 The
concessionaire had been told that he had to have insurance and
that he could get it from Foremost, which was providing insurance
for Knievel and the sponsor.19 He gave Foremost's agent $300 for
insurance coverage and the agent told him he was "covered."' 4° He
did not tell the agent what kind of insurance he wanted, was not
told what he was buying, and was never given any insurance policy.
ic .141
T

The three-judge majority of the Idaho Supreme Court stated
that the doctrine of reasonable expectations was not the law in
Idaho.141 Presumably it meant the doctrine in its strongest form as
espoused by Keeton, since the majority went on to say that "insurance policies [should] be construed most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved in favor of the in-

132. Id. at 177.
133. Id.
134. C&JFertilizer,227 N.W.2d at 182 (LeGrandJ., dissenting).

135. Id. at 184.
136. Id. at 183.
137. 627 P.2d 317 (Idaho 1981).

138. Id. at 318-19.
139. Id. at 319.
140. Id.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 321.
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sured." 45 Their test was "what a reasonable person in the position
of the insured would have understood the language of the contract
to mean."'" The majority accepted and affirmed the trial court's
finding that the concessionaire intended to insure against loss by
theft and believed he had such coverage, and that this was a reasonable belief under the facts of the case. 45
The two dissenting justices reviewed the facts and determined
that there was neither an ambiguity nor a reasonable expectation. 146
Knievel and the sponsors of the jump were required to have liability insurance. 147 No first-party coverage (fire, theft, et cetera) was
They bought liability insurance from Foremost. 149
required. 4
They told the concessionaire he would need insurance 5" There
was no indication he would have bought any insurance if it were
not required. 5 ' He asked the sponsors to take care of his required
insurance, and they did so by making him an additional insured on
their liability insurance policy. 5 2 Clearly, both the concessionaire

and Foremost intended his coverage to be the required coverage for liability only.' 5'
Finally, the dissent pointed out the obvious fallacy in the majority's position. 1,4 Where is the outer limit for what the insured
might have expected? Could it include insurance on his automobiles? Employee dishonesty? Accidental death? With tongue
probably in cheek, Justice Bakes suggested the potential absurdity
155
of the majority's approach:
What are, I wonder, the outer limits of [the concessionaire's] oral contract for insurance "coverage"? If [his
wife] was blessed with a child during Knievel's jump,
could [they] recover maternity benefits? How about life
insurance for any children, or [his] horse? I think the
limits of [his] coverage should be established, not by his

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Putzier,627 P.2d at 321.
Id.
Id.at 323.
Id. at 324-25 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.at 324.
Putzier,627 P.2d at 324 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting).
Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 324-25.
Id.

155.

Putzier, 627 P.2d at 325 n.1 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting).
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secret and unexpressed desires, but by the context in
which the insurance was obtained. Thus, the trial court
should consider the probability that [he] intended to
procure, and Foremost intended to sell, only that coverage which satisfied the county's requirements, which did
not include first[-] party coverage.'
B. Result ofJudicialExcess: HigherPremiums, or Coverage Not Offered
One result of judicial excess in applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations is unpredictability, 5 1 which may defeat the
pro-insured intent since it will prompt insurers either to raise premiums or to stop writing certain coverages lest the courts disregard
express exclusions and limitations in their policies. 5 1 Judicial decision-makers should balance the need for an efficient system of
broadly available insurance coverage against their desire to aid one
insured in an individual case. 5 9
As the New Hampshire Supreme Court wisely noted:
[A] garage liability policy is one of the most complex, and
perhaps least understood, liability forms in use today. Its
complexity is largely attributable to the breadth of coverage. However[,] although it may be difficult for an untrained layman to understand the nature of coverages
written, that, in itself, does not warrant distorting the risk
undertaken by the insurer. If companies are to continue
solvent and capable of serving an important public interest, they must carefully protect themselves against risks
156. Id.
157. See Craig Litsey, Property Insurance Coverage and Policy Exclusions: Problems of Multiple Causation, 35 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 415, 417 (1985). Recognizing
the importance of predictability, Litsey notes:
Predictability is important for several reasons, not the least of which is
that it helps ensure that insurance premiums accurately reflect the risks
involved. Predictability enables policyholders to better understand [sic]
the ambit of their coverage and know whether their policy will include or
exclude peripheral losses. The company can then determine premiums
accordingly. With the parties more certain of their respective positions,

settlements are more easily arrived at and litigation is reduced. Insurers
are then able to pay claims more quickly and at a lower internal cost.
Id.

158. See id.; see also American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
565 F. Supp. 1485, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that courts must consider the effects of their decisions on the cost of insurance).
159. See American Home Prods., 565 F. Supp. at 1512 (emphasizing the need
for uniformity in decisions).
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which they have not covered
and for which no premiums
60
have been paid to them.

VI. ARE THERE SOLUTIONS?
A.

Objective Standard

To be fair to all insureds, if the doctrine of reasonable expectations is to be applied at all, an objective standard should be used.
This substantially would reduce the potential
for abuse and would
•,•
161
produce a higher level of predictability.
It would lead to increased equity between insurer and insured and also among all of
the insureds, whose premium payments
are the source of funds to
16 2
pay judgments against insurers.
B.

Ambiguity

A clear distinction should be made between the universally accepted rule that ambiguities ordinarily will be resolved in favor of
the insured and the doctrine of reasonable expectations as propounded by Keeton. It is quite proper to consider the insured's
reasonable expectations in resolving ambiguities, but that should
be viewed as basic contract law and not as an exception to general
principles of contract interpretation. It is an entirely different matter for a court to require coverage that the insurance policy clearly
and unambiguously does not provide. One of the best arguments
for applying Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine is that it
may discourage courts from finding ambiguity where none exists. 161
Keeton's straightforward approach, if applied objectively and sen-

160. Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Motors, Inc., 244 A.2d 64, 67 (N.H. 1968) (citations omitted).
161. See Fett, supra note 2, at 1136. In contrast, under a subjective standard,
policyholders would not know whether their premium dollars were paying for the
claims of others (claims which they may have believed were not covered under
their own policies). With a subjective standard, it would not be possible for an
insurance company to know or limit its risks because interpretation of the policy
would be decided on an individual basis. See id. at 1136-37.
162. See Keeton, supranote 3, at 968.
163. See Diane M. Lucas, Comment, Decapitationto Cure Dandruff? The Scope
of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine of Darner Motors Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984), 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 841,
845 (1988) (commending the Arizona Supreme Court for clearly stating the reasoning behind its extension of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to contracts where no ambiguities are present).
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sibly, would be more likely to produce certainty and predictability.

C. Unconscionability

The doctrine of reasonable expectations should not be used to
provide coverage in cases where a limitation or exclusion from
coverage is deemed to be unconscionable. Such policy provisions
should be unenforceable simply because they are unconscionable,
regardless of the expectations of the particular insured. Insurers
should not be allowed to limit or exclude coverage where it would
be inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the average
consumer of the type of insurance in question. This should apply
even though the policy provisions are very clear and unambiguous,
and regardless of whether the particular insured has not read and
understood the provision at issue. 16 Enforcement of such provisions should be uniformly denied as a matter of public policy, because it would be unconscionable to enforce them. There is no
reason why insureds who are unaware of unconscionable provisions
should receive less protection for their
premium dollars than those
66

who are aware of such provisions.

While it is certainly within the power of the courts to strike
down unconscionable policy provisions, such action leads to unpredictability, since judicial action can operate only retroactively.
It would be much better for the legislatures, whose actions have a
prospective effect, to declare which policy provisions thereafter will
be unenforceable because they are deemed to be unconscionable.
This will give insurers
ample opportunity to react in an appropriate
167
and timely way.

164. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 968.
165. See id. (noting that insurers know most ordinary insureds will not read
their policies).
166. See id. at 974. "If the enforcement of a policy provision would defeat
the reasonable expectations of the great majority of policyholders to whose claims
it is relevant, it will not be enforced even against those who know of its restrictive
terms." Id.
167. See Spencer L. Kimble, Book Review, 19 CoNN. L. REv. 311, 315 & n.24
(1987) (discussing the retroactive effect of judicial decisions and the uncertainty
it creates).
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D. Redraft Policies and/orRaise Premiums

As some commentators have noted, "the courts have been the
chief architects of a great bulk of the verbose and highly technical
policy language. " 168 When insurers are forced to pay claims they
thought were not covered, they often go back to the drawing board
and try to confine the coverage to that which they intended. In
most cases this results in increasingly long and complex policies.
Some insurers have attempted to solve the problem of providing unintended coverage by adopting standard policy forms that
are relatively brief and are written in very simple language which
the average insured is capable of understanding. In simplifying
their policies insurers know that they are granting broader coverage to all insureds, but they have decided it is better to raise their
premiums and charge for the extra coverage than try to exclude it.
Another possible approach is for insurers to change the basic
design of their policies. Most current insurance policies are designed to provide broad coverage initially and then to eliminate
some of this coverage through exclusions and limitations. The alternative to this modem "all risk with exclusions" approach would
be to return to the "specified risk" approach of the past. 169 Here,

one starts with no coverage and then lists "inclusions" of coverage
for specific situations.170 For the insured, the "broad coverage with
exclusions" approach is much more desirable, because it will provide coverage for many unexpected situations which are not specifically mentioned in the policy, while the "specified risk" or "inclusion" approach would not. 7' Thus, the action of the courts to
broaden coverage by refusing to enforce exclusions ultimately
could lead to an undesirable narrowing of coverage. 172
E.

Help Insureds Understand Their Coverage

Over the years courts repeatedly have warned insurers that
they are largely responsible for problems relating to the coverage

168. E. Neil Young et al., Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends,
625 INS. L.J. 71, 72 (1975).
169. See Ware, supra note 22, at 1472.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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expectations of insureds.'
As the New Jersey Supreme Court
pointed out,
[m]uch of the difficulty may be laid at the doorstep of
the ...insurance industry itself for, despite repeated cau-

tions from the courts, it has persisted in using language
which is obscure to the layman and in tolerating agency
practices which are calculated to lead the layman to believe that he has coverage beyond
that which may be
4
called for by a literal reading.
Insurers would be well advised to (1) write their policies in
language which can be easily understood by the average layman;'75
(2) be sure that exclusions and limitations are conspicuous, plain
and clear, and delineated in bold type; 7 6 and (3) specifically bring
exclusions and limitations to the attention of the insured, either by
requiring him to acknowledge such provisions in
writing or by hav177
ing his attention focused on them by the agent.
As I have indicated previously, this inevitably will result in
broader coverage and higher cost, but that probably would be outweighed by the increase in certainty and predictability and the accompanying reduction in disputes and litigation. It also would require more rigorous training of insurance agents, to be sure they
understand and can explain clearly the coverage of the policies
they sell and the limitations of coverage. It is certainly in the public interest to have the needs of insurance consumers served by a
host of articulate, well-trained insurance agents.

173. See, e.g., Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638, 642 (N.J.
1965) (noting the insurance agent's role in the policyholder's common misunderstanding of interim coverage prior to the company's investigation of the application).
174. Id.
175. See Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 68 (Alaska
1977) ("We do not look with favor upon poorly[-]worded language in insurance
contracts, and we would urge insurers to reword policies to more clearly align
[sic] the language with what we believe to be the reasonable expectations of a
purchaser ...").
176. See Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Manderfeld, 482 N.W.2d 521,
525 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the insured could not argue he was misled
since the exclusion was "delineated clearly in bold letters").
177. See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 295-96 (Cal. 1962) (discussing cases which state that it is unjust to void the insured's coverage where the
exclusionary clause was not brought to the insured's attention).
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VII. CONCLUSION

There can be no question that standard forms for insurance
coverage benefit both insurers and insureds by greatly reducing the
costs involved. The mere fact that the insurer usually drafts the
contract does not necessarily mean that it will include only provisions favorable to it and unfavorable to the insured. In a free market, insurers will try to include those coverages for which there is
consumer demand, so long as consumers are willing to pay a fair
price for those coverages.""
We probably must accept the fact that most insureds will not
voluntarily read their policies and, at most, merely will scan the
first page. In light of this, it is probably fair to hold that any exclusions or limitations which would not be reasonably expected by an
average consumer of the type of insurance at issue will be unenforceable unless they are brought to the attention of the insured in
a clear and understandable way. This will give the insured the opportunity to accept the policy as is, reject it, or attempt to obtain
separate coverage for the excluded risk.
As Professor Kenneth Abraham has stated so well:
It is deceptively easy to find an insured's expectations
"reasonable" and require that they be honored in order
to mitigate the consequences of the insured's unfortunate
loss. It is more difficult, but very important, to realize that
the award of compensation in such cases may have more
profound effects than a simple reduction of the insurer's
surplus. Saving one insured from catastrophe may not
simply spread a neutral risk to all insureds; it may spread
it in ways that a court sensitive79 to the consequences of its
actions would find disturbing.
It is high time to back away from the excessive liberality of
some courts in honoring reasonable expectations that are not reasonable at all. But the quid pro quo for this must be a recognition
and acceptance by insurers of their duty to have their policies accurately reflect the reasonable expectations of their insureds, and to
give their insureds an opportunity to know and understand what is
covered and what is not.

178. See Ware, supra note 22, at 1477-78 (discussing the benefits of standard
form contracts, including the reduction in transaction costs).
179. Abraham, supra note 46, at 1188-89.
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